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The reflexive nature of consciousness [electronic resource] / Greg Janzen.

By: Janzen, Greg.
Contributor(s): ebrary, Inc.
Series: Advances in consciousness research: v. 72.Publisher: Amsterdam ; Philadelphia : John Benjamins, c2008Description: vi, 186 p. ; 25 cm.Subject(s): Consciousness | Phenomenology | Self-consciousness (Awareness) | SelfGenre/Form: Electronic books. DDC classification: 126 Online resources: An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view
Contents:
Introduction -- Conscious states, reflexivity, and phenomenal character -- Some remarks on methodology -- Some semantics of "consciousness" -- Preamble -- Creature consciousness : transitive and intransitive -- State consciousness -- Unconscious mental states -- Self-consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness -- A formula for state consciousness -- Nagel's what-it-is-like formula -- Putative counterexamples -- Non-conscious phenomenality? -- Summary -- Consciousness and self-awareness -- Preamble -- A gloss on intentionality -- The transitivity principle -- Two positive arguments for the transitivity principle -- Higher-orderism -- Preamble -- The higher-order theory of consciousness -- A "one-state" alternative -- Preamble -- The Brentanian model -- Objections and replies -- Representationalism -- Preamble -- The representational theory of phenomenal character -- The nature of phenomenal character -- Preamble -- Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness -- Some brief remarks on privacy -- Conclusion.
Item type Current location Call number Status Date due Barcode
126 (Browse shelf) Available

Includes bibliographical references (p. [173]-182) and indexes.

Introduction -- Conscious states, reflexivity, and phenomenal character -- Some remarks on methodology -- Some semantics of "consciousness" -- Preamble -- Creature consciousness : transitive and intransitive -- State consciousness -- Unconscious mental states -- Self-consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness -- A formula for state consciousness -- Nagel's what-it-is-like formula -- Putative counterexamples -- Non-conscious phenomenality? -- Summary -- Consciousness and self-awareness -- Preamble -- A gloss on intentionality -- The transitivity principle -- Two positive arguments for the transitivity principle -- Higher-orderism -- Preamble -- The higher-order theory of consciousness -- A "one-state" alternative -- Preamble -- The Brentanian model -- Objections and replies -- Representationalism -- Preamble -- The representational theory of phenomenal character -- The nature of phenomenal character -- Preamble -- Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness -- Some brief remarks on privacy -- Conclusion.

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Electronic reproduction. Palo Alto, Calif. : ebrary, 2009. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ebrary affiliated libraries.